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Professional Ethics in Engineering 
FORUM 
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS I1V ENGRVEERLNG: 
THE CtL4LLENGER AND CORPORATE CULTURE 
Joseph G. Ferrante 
INTRODUCTION 
Ethics in engineering is an important issue that affects the daily lives of almost everyone in the world. Because 
engineers and related scientists design, develop, and manufacture the many products that the public-at-large uses or 
consumes on a daily basis, it is in the best interest of all concerned that engineers be held to high ethical standards. This 
paper will reflect on the corporate culture issues involved in ethics in engheaing, and specifically how corporate culture 
can affect ethical engineering and how it did in the case of the Challenger disaster. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
While it is important to understand the events 
surrounding the Challenger disaster, and particularly the 
recollection of the engineer involved, Roger Boisjolay, the 
events will not be recounted here, as most of the events 
have become common knowledge in the aviationlaerospace 
communities. However, there is a more important question 
at hand to discuss: what role does corporate culture play in 
engineering ethics? 
According to a leading researcher in the field of 
ethics in engineering, engineers have a responsibility that 
goes f&r beyond the building of machines and 
systems. This researcher observes that this cannot be left to 
the technical illiterates, or even to literate and overloaded 
technical administrators to decide what is safe and for the 
public good (McDonald 10). 
As all of us as professionals know, we must tell 
what we know, first through normal administrative 
channels, but when these fail, through whatever avenues we 
can find. Many claim that it is disloyal to protest. 
Sometimes the penalty disapproval, loss of status, even 
vilification-can be severe. The fkct that people are in a 
hierarchy tends to amplify misperceptions. A low-level 
person has a k r  that something might happen and 
reports it to a higher level. As it goes up the 
hierarchy, information gets distorted, usually to reflect the 
interests of the managers (Bell and Esch 50). 
By their very natures, corporate cultures tend to try 
to ignore the unpleasant, a situation that can only be 
counterbalanced by deliberately creating a culture that 
encourages people to bring up unpleasant information. One 
such philosophy, developed by The Boeing Company, is 
called 'Working Together." Working together is an idea 
that evaporates if you think too hard about it, but it seems 
to have a fierce power that can inspire men and women. 
Working Together is a point of conflict to begin 
with. An engineer with pride tends to want to h d  
solutions to his problems. And it's against nature to go out 
publicly and explore the particular problems that an 
engineer faces (Sabbagh 66). Working Together anbodies 
that very notion that goes against the in-grained nature of 
engineering. Working Together teaches engineers that 
attention can be given to a particular problem, by making 
it all right to express your problems. The belief that no one 
person can find a solution as easily as a large group is the 
cornerstone principle of "Working Together." 
In a group trying to move ahead with a decision, 
you find that those people that have anything negative to 
say are unpopular, so a manager deliberately has to 
encourage people taking the devil's advocate position. In a 
crisis situation, such as the Challenger case, somebody has 
got to think about the possibility of something going wrong, 
and to use a worst-case scenario approach, as Roger 
Boisjoly did in predicting that there would be loss of life on 
the launch pad. 
Corporate cultures that do not embrace close 
working relationships such as Boeing's, tend to ''kill the 
messenger" bearing the bad news rather than punish those 
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directly responsible for a consequence. And while it is 
generally thought that this culture is the result of managers, 
it becomes apparent that it is all too often the result of line 
workers. In these types of situations, people who "hang 
tough" with their organization tend to do very well, in the 
fundamental belief that not protesting is highly valued and 
that the very organization they may have doubts about will 
always protect them. 
Unfortunately, these same people tend not to use 
acceptable risk analysis in determining what is right and 
what is wrong. And in engineering, this can be a deadly 
combination. As Roger Boisjoly himselfstated, "More than 
20 years ago I received some superb advice fiom a QA 
(quality assurance) manager that I have applied throughout 
my career. He told me to ask myselfthe following question 
when fkced with a tough question of whether a product was 
acceptable: 'Would you allow your wife or children to use 
this product without any reservations?' If I could not 
answer that question with an unqualified, 'Yes,' he said, I 
should not sign off on the product for others to use. That is 
what ethical analysis of acceptable risk should be," 
(Boisjoly 1 1). 
Yet, it is this very, correct belief that ended Roger 
Boisjoly's career with his employer, Morton-Thiokol, in the 
wake of the Challenger disaster. As a result of his 
testimony before Congress regarding problems with 
Challenger's design, Roger Boisjoly was isolated fiom the 
rest of his colleagues in the belief that his very testimony 
was causing more harm than good to Morton-Thiokol, a 
belief championed by none other than the Chief Executive 
mcer  of Morton-Thiokol himself 
This brings up an interesting notion commonly 
believed in the corporate world, that company culture stems 
fiom top management and "fans out" to the rank and file 
below. It must be noted, however, that even with a culture 
stemming fiom the top, it is often hard to change the minds 
of workers on the line, who might be used to the "old-way" 
of doing things. However, with quality such an important 
issue in any business, it seems as if that trend is changing. 
Many people want to work in a non-hostile, open 
environment. The more people that get involved with that 
type of attitude, the easier it becomes to break down the 
barriers of the few that dismiss "new age" working 
environments (Sabbagh 66). 
The author of this paper, himself a Chief 
Executive Officer, considers this such an important item, 
that employees are considered a "strategic asset" with his 
company, and as such are included in the strategic plan, 
which indicates that his company wishes to "attract 
energetic, dedicated, and good-spirited employees and 
compensate them above industry standards," (Jet 
Development Group, Inc.). While this does not expressly 
address the notion of capmate culture, the inference drawn 
is that employees are the most important assets that any 
company has, and as such those employees have a right to 
share in the management and direction the company takes. 
And while the corporate culture put in place by 
Boeing and others has had tremendous e&d, especially in 
the engineering world, it is of interesting note what the 
corporate culture of Morton-Thiokol has gained: nothing. 
The fate of Morton-Thiokol? They are out of business. 
CONCLUSION 
The research on the subject of whistleblowers 
leads to two conclusions. First, that whistleblowers tend to 
achieve problem resolution through their organizational 
chain of command. And second, in almost every case they 
are punished by the organkition after whistleblowing 
outside of the organization. Nowhere was this more 
evident than in the Challenger disaster and the Morton- 
Thiokol engineer, Roger Boisjoly. 
Today we need more critical pronouncements and 
declarations by engineers in high professional 
responsibilities. In some instances, such criticism must be 
severe if we are properly to serve mankind and preserve our 
fieedom. Hence it is of the utmost importance that we 
maintain our fieedom of communication in the 
engineering profession and to the public. Perhaps if the 
engineering community had followed this advice fifteen 
years ago, Challenger and her seven crew-members might 
still be flying, exploring the unknown space beyond our 
surly bonds of Earth. Instead, little remains but ashes.0 
Joseph Ferrante is a junior in the undergraduate Aeronautical Science program at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. 
He holds a private pilot certificate with an instrument rating and is currently pursuing his lifelong &earn of becoming a 
professional airline pilot. 
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